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Abstract
This paper discusses some of the impacts the Internet has made so far on forms of
various forms of transnational governance. Contrary to expectations, experience
with new communication technologies on the local level have so far been
disappointing. In my view, this can be explained by the fact that the use of ICT
for institutions lies first and foremost in the enhancing of legitimacy. However,
local government is usually legitimised by some form of elections. National and
local bureaucracies, though more vulnerable in terms of legitimacy, are long-
established institutions. By contrast, the legitimacy of many international forms
of governance is increasingly contested. The European Union had already to
change its policy following the Maastricht Crisis through the introduction of
freedom of information legislation. Challenged by NGO coalitions which are
empowered by the new ICTs, more and more international organisations seek
now to increase procedural legitimacy by using the Internet for electronic
consultation.
Introduction
Progress in information technology has been put in perspective by Westlake (1997: 135)
who pointed to the fact that until relatively recently, typed documents would give rise to a
maximum of five or six "carbon copies. Today, the Internet makes large amounts of
complex information (long documents, databases) over long distances available to every
citizen with access to a networked computer. Access is both rapid and low cost. In terms of
culture the Internet has long been seen as an anarchic communications system which
creates a new kind of public space (Smythe/Smith 1999). Most citizen could also become
providers of information at relatively low costs. Moreover, the Internet is based on a free-
information ethos, ‘‘which can be seen in the reluctance of publishers on the Internet to
charge for access to their services’’ (Trench/O’Donnell 1997: 230). Discussions of impacts on
governance have long been focussed on the local level. Attention shifts now to the
international or global level. I will first discuss the lack of legitimacy from which several
forms of international governance suffer today. I will then present some of the proposals
made to enhance legitimacy. As it is to be shown the Internet plays an increasingly
important role. In reality, the European Union makes more and more use of the Internet to
increase transparency of its processes and outputs. This is contrasted with the operation of
a freedom of information right. Last, I turn to the impact of the Internet on the role of
NGOs in international governance and the reactions of. various international
organisations.Shifting the Balance of Power? 3
Local cybercommunities?
The Internet has sometimes been portrayed as having the potential of revolutionizing and
democratizing traditional forms of governance and enabling a new form of democracy.
Given that technological progress has diminished spatial and temporal obstacles to
electronic voting, the move to an electronic democracy seems at least technically feasible
(OECD 1998).In the United States the concept of ‘‘electronic democracy’’ has been a central
feature of the technological Utopias proposed by scholars, politicians and activists since the
1960s. A focus on the local level has been probably inspired by the American nostalgia for
the community being a small town where the ‘‘human scale’’ everyday affairs, including
politics could be reached again through a revival in form of ‘‘local cybercommunities’’. Since
the 1970s opportunities of teledemocracy have been experimented with. There is now a
number of operative systems, for example the Blacksburg Electronic Village, Virginia, the
Minnesota E-Democracy, the community-based California Smart Community etc.
(Savolainen/Anttiroikko 1999 with further references). Projects of electronic local networks
have spread from the United States into Europe (Bryan et al. 1997).
Yet, empirical research on the impact of the new ICTs on national and local level has so far
often delivered disappointing results. Most electronic democracy projects remain at an
experimental stage. In spite of the discourses of interactivity which underlie the initiatives,
most of them have in practice been executive- initiated, top down and mostly based on
giving more access to information. The extent to which the participatory process was
enhanced remains unclear (Tsagarousianou 1997: 174). Similarly, on a national level
governments tend not to show much enthusiasm for the offering of information to citizens
and even less to seek their input into policy proposals (OECD 1998).
One of the main findings of a research project on the use of ICTs by voluntary and
community organisations in Ireland was that a range of financial, technical, organisational
and cultural factors inhibited the adoption of newer ICTs. Information and communication
technologies were not found to be a necessary or, even less, a sufficient condition of active
citizenship. The technologies could not by themselves create a more participatory political
culture. ‘‘Many voluntary and community organisations are functioning effectively without
using computers’’ (Trench/O’Donnell 1997. 217). Moreover, the survey evidence indicate
that voluntary and community organisations were protective and territorial about their
i n f o r m a t i o nb o t ho nag e o g r a p h i c a la n do natopic basis. Voluntary organisations inShifting the Balance of Power? 4
cognate areas were more inclined to collect and compile their information than to seek it
from, or offer it to, other similar organisations (Trench/O’Donnell 1997: 229).
In my view, the reluctance of local and national governments to adopt and use information
technologies to the end of enhancing accountability and participation of citizens can be
easily explained in terms of costs and benefits. Access to information and participation are
usually linked to legitimacy (Gentot 1995: 4; Fiorino 1996: 196). However, the source of
legitimacy of local and national governments is traditionally the ballot. As a rule, elected
governments have relatively little to gain from making more meaningful information
available on the Internet and from seeking public input. By contrast, there are other forms
of governance which have been since long diagnosed to suffer from a lack of legitimacy. Not
surprisingly, the European Union heads this list.
Dimensions of Legitimacy (Deficits)
Most scholars identify different aspects of legitimacy and accordingly, also different
reasons for a lack of legitimacy. Many forms of transnational governance are seen as
defective in this respect. However, there is now an increasing consensus that different
modes of governance might require different forms of legitimation. Increased transparency
in general and the use of the Internet in particular is increasingly recommended as a cure.
Majone distinguishes between two main dimensions of legitimacy: procedural and
substantive (1998). This could be roughly equated with input and output legitimacy. The
input structures of governance are traditionally legitimised by democratic political
elections and majoritarian government. Accountability is a key mechanism. It is defined as
the ability to determine who in the government is responsible for a decision or action and
the ability to ensure that officials in government are answerable for their actions. Elections
are seen as the most basic way to ensure that accountability. The question how to hold
non-elected state officials accountable is more problematic. In a Westminster system, these
officials are accountable to Parliament, while on the Continent more emphasis is put on
accountability to courts (Allum 1989: 369 ff.). The legitimacy of a political system depends
also on its capacity to achieve the citizens goals and solve their problems, i.e. output
legitimacy (Höreth 1999: 251).Shifting the Balance of Power? 5
Transparency has been analysed in terms of a principle which operates at several levels of
an institutional order and influences a wide number of instruments (Chiti 1996. 370). It
shall be defined here as the comprehensibility (accessibility) of political and administrative
structures, responsibilities, processes and outcomes (for a ranking of different degrees of
process transparency see table below).
The EU legitimacy problem seems to be indeed multidimensional (Höreth 1999: 251), given
that the level of EU powers goes far beyond those of international organisations. Weiler
discusses in length the lack of a constitution, the absence of an EU demos- and telos and
last, the ‘‘democratic deficit’’ of the EU which is in itself a combination of numerous
different aspects. Three approaches to European governance: internationalism,
supranationalism,a n dinfranationalism reflect at the same time different realities (Weiler
1997b: 276). In some crucial spheres Union governance is international, in other spheres
supranational and yet others infranational. One feature which in Weiler’s view pervade all
Community governance is the overall lack of transparency.P a r t l yt h i si sar e s u l to ft h e
added layer of governance and its increased remoteness and partly a problem of the
decision-making process.
•  International issues are fundamental system rules such as treaties, and issues with
immediate political and electoral resonance
•  Supranational issues are taken from the primary legislative agenda of the community.
Instances of supranational decision-making would be the adoption of the big framework
harmonization directives such as banking or video rental rights or the Tobacco Labelling
Directive. Actors are governments and community institutions
•  In infranationalism actors deal with standard setting and implementing and executive
measures. They are usually ‘‘second level organs of governance’’, with members of
Government departments, certain NGOs etc.
In the view of Weiler, all these modes of governance suffer from low process transparency.
Actor and event visibility differ, with internationalism ranking highest, and
infranationalism ranking lowest. In Weiler’s perspective infranationalism gives greater
cause for worries than supranational features of European integration:
‘‘It is time to worry about infranationalism - a complex network of middle level national
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access to a process with huge social and economic consequences to everyday life - in matters of public
safety, health, and all other dimensions of socio-economic regulation.” (1997a: 151)
A regulatory model of the EC and thereby infranationalism has been focussed on by
Majone rather than forms of state building or intergovernmental bargaining. He identified
a lack of transparency caused by the growing numbers of committees, working groups,
agencies, the overlap of their activities and the divergence between the rules governing
their functioning (Majone 1998: 22). Committees at the EU can be classified into advisory,
management and regulatory ones. The budget for 1996 listed approximately 400
committees. Much of the work done in committees has been characterised by secrecy:
‘‘Working documents and protocols of committee sessions have rarely seen the light of the
day’’ (Demmke 1997: 27 ff.). EC Agencies might indeed represent a fourth and increasingly
important mode of EU governance. In the beginning of the nineties a number of
independent agencies was set up which perform ‘‘technical’’ tasks or are engaged in
information gathering and analysis. The move to the agencies is seen as being fuelled by
the low legitimacy of the Commission. To evade current popular hostility and yet to enlarge
the Union, agencies have been proliferated and expanded rather than the Commission
itself (Shapiro 1997: 290). While the creation of the first generation of Agencies in the early
nineties can hardly be directly related to events, Shapiro’s analysis seems to be supported
by the background of proposals to set up a new European Food and Public Health
Authority. This obviously follows directly from the BSE ‘‘mad cow’’ crisis when the
inadequateness of the way scientific advice was managed in the Consumer Protection
Directorate became clear
1.
Very different views have been expressed concerning the output of the European Union. On
the one hand, the European Union’s general efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with
political problems was seen as a source of legitimacy (Höreth 1999: 251). On the other hand
the output in terms of legislation has been sharply criticised as being detailed, over-
regulated, non-transparent and difficult to implement and apply in the legal systems of the
Member States (Demmke/Hochgürtel 1997: 191 with further references).
1 ENDS Environment Daily 13 December 1999: Outline for EU Public Health Agency emerges,
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Transnational networks outside the EU are likely to be subject to similar criticism as EU
comitology. Government networks can function particularly well in a rapidly changing
environment that thrives on the exchange of information and the ability to use it in
different ways. However, networks summon suspicions - of secrecy, technocracy, exclusion
and conspiracy. It is not clear how agencies participating in transgovernmental networks
can be hold accountable to the ‘‘democratic constituencies.’’ At the same time, the
accountability of international organisations and of Non-Governmental Organisations is
hardly better developed. The UN suffers from the perception that it is responsive primarily
to its own bureaucracy, the IMF and the World Bank are widely seen as fronts for the
United States, the EU institutions have been in crisis over a ‘‘democratic deficit’’ etc.
(Slaughter 2000).
I now turn to the question how the legitimacy deficit of transnational forms of governance
can be addressed with a special focus on the EU. More and more scholars agree on two
points: First, transnational forms of governance will in future become increasingly
powerful. Majone predicts that more and more specific functional tasks that can be tackled
more efficiently at the supranational level will be delegated to European institutions (1998:
28). Second, standards of legitimacy which are derived from a national context may not
seem apt in an international one (Héritier 1999: 279). A model of democracy which is
developed in the national context cannot be easily transferred to the EU. A legitimisation
by simple repetition of majoritarian forms of governance would be inappropriate.
This conclusion has also led to complacency. It has been argued that the more informal,
fluid forms of representation, though not meeting standards of popular sovereignty set by
traditional democratic theory, reflect the reality of the EU as a polity composed of multiple
identities embedded at multiple levels of governance. The authors then proceed to contrast
a model of legitimacy at the national level to one ‘‘more appropriate to the EU as a multi-
level polity’’. Legitimacy in a multi-level polity is thought to be acquired through
representation by European institutions alongside national institutions; plural and
informal forms of representation. Recognition is expressed through interest articulation
and mobilization and ‘‘multiple, compatible’’ identities (Banchoff/Smith 1999). However,
this approach seems rather too simplistic and pragmatic. The mere variety of institutions
and interest groups which make an input to EU decisions - in other words, the
maintenance of the status quo - cannot by itself render EU governance legitimate.Shifting the Balance of Power? 8
While other scholars accept that national forms of legitimisation cannot simply be
exported, they still question the status-quo. To increase transparency and accountability
various proposals are made. In Majone’s view regulatory policies predominate as an EU
mode of governance. Other than distributive policies, regulatory policies can be
legitimately managed by carefully designed agencies. To this end, a number of rules have
to be adopted which specify which procedures shall be followed in administrative decision-
making and how various groups can participate directly in the decision-making process.
After the decision has been taken, monitoring shall be ensured through ongoing legislative
and executive oversight, the budgetary process, judicial review, reorganisations, citizen’s
complaints or professional sanctions. Though in general sceptical, Shapiro considered the
mere existence of agencies of ‘‘defined structure and jurisdiction’’ as an improvement in
transparency compared to the comitology process. He suggested that more ways could be
found to introduce transparency and participation into the internal processes of the new
agencies (1997: 291).
To the end of establishing regulatory networks as a legitimate form of governance,
Slaughter suggests to (1) adapt domestic governance structures in various ways and to
create (2) ‘‘various internet-based processes of decision-making that will enhance
transparency and access’’. This shall be combined with developing explicit principles of
transnational governance. It is proposed to put on a variety of transparency requirements
on transnational networks, such as the publication of a record of meetings held and issues
discussed and decided, as well as a calendar of upcoming meetings and projects. To the
extent that participants in a government network are engaged in actual policymaking or
implementation activities, they can be required to adopt ‘‘notice and comment procedures’’
(Slaughter 2000).
The most far-reaching proposal to use the Internet for improving the legitimacy of the
European Union was probably put forward by Weiler. He suggested to place the entire
decision-making process - especially, but not only Comitology - on the Internet. The key
organisational principle would be that each Community decision-making project intended
to result in the eventual adoption of a Community norm would have a ‘‘decisional web site’’
on the Internet within the general Lexcalibur ‘‘Home Page’’. This would identify the scope
and purpose of the proposed legislative or regulatory measure, the Community and
Member States persons or administrative departments or divisions responsible for the
process and a timetable. Access should be provided to all non-confidential documents whichShifting the Balance of Power? 9
are part of the process. Weiler stresses that the primary mode and locus of governance
would and should remain intact: political institutions, meetings of elected representative
and officials parliamentary debates, media reporting etc. However, Lexcalibur could
enhance the potential of all actors to play a much more informed, critical and involved role.
The most immediate direct beneficiaries would be media, interested pressure groups,
NGO’s and the like. The improved information system would serve as a basis for a system
that allows widespread participation in policy-making processes through a possible two-
tier system comprising a forum with limited access and an open forum where all interested
actors could participate (Weiler 1997a: 153).
The Internet and Freedom of Information Rights
I shall now turn to discuss in detail to which degree the Internet addresses the problems of
visibility and transparency of transnational forms of governance. Visibility seems indeed to
be enhanced through websites. This is very much regarded as a first step, since the
creation of a ‘‘virtual incarnation of a government network through a website’’ allows those
who would be in charge (voters, congressional committees and regulated entities) to begin
to assert control or impose constraints in a number of ways (Slaughter 2000)
The question of transparency is far more complex. In the OECD Report different degrees of
process transparency are listed in descending cumulative order (1998: Section 179).
1. Widespread publication of the decision
2. Clear explanation of the decision
3. Identification of who provided input
4. Publication of inputs
5. Prior to the decision being taken, publication of the
problem definition and the options being considered
6. open voting
The Lexcalibur page as proposed by Weiler would have the potential to provide for five
degrees of transparency. However, there is a number of tricky issues involved which
require fine-tuning. The identification of who provided input could be limited to comments
received via Internet (or in letter form). Instances of personal access to decision-makers
(such as meetings for lunch) are not likely to be published on Internetsites. Neither will theShifting the Balance of Power? 10
different degrees of importance which decision-makers might attach to comments be spelt
out on the Internet. Most importantly, it is doubtful whether the Internetsite itself can be a
source of dialogue and can thereby foster a more ‘‘deliberative process’’ as Weiler expected.
The Lexcalibur project might seem revolutionary or utopian. However, the European
Commission employs the Internet already now to make its legislative output more
transparent. The Internet based database Eur-Lex provides an overview of all EC
legislation adopted in e.g. competition policy, taxation, environment consumers and health
protection etc
2. The full text of directives (including consolidated versions of often amended
texts) is made available for free. Thereby the first degree of transparency has already been
achieved (see in box). Moreover, proposals for directives (included those which have been
stuck several years ago in the legislative pipeline) are now available. In some cases, the
Commission has also used the Internet to obtain input on the development of its policies,
e.g. on the Green Paper on Public Sector Information
3. The role of this paper was explicitly
defined as addressing the key questions and proposing policy options rather than
predicting the future or promoting particular solutions. Comments received have been
posted on the WebSite. Currently there are several electronic Forums operating gathering
opinions on policy in general and specific Commission proposals in particular
4.
The transfer of Lexcalibur from utopia into the real world seems all the more plausible
when one considers that the opening up of the legislative process is not an entirely new
concept for the European Commission. Following the Maastricht Crisis when the Danish
no in the Referendum ‘‘came as a severe shockt ot h ew h o l eE Cs y s t e m ’ ’( W e s t l a k e1 9 9 7 :
136), the Commission has put emphasis on openness, transparency and public
consultation
5. By contrast, the Council which has traditionally legislated behind closed
2 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/index.html
3 Public sector information - a key resource for Europe. Green Paper on public sector information
in the information society. COM (98) 585
4 See for instance European Internet Forum http://www.ispo.cec.be/HyperNews/get/eif.html See
http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEU/responses.html for responses to a
specific Commission proposal
5 Lodge regards the pressure brought on the Commission to open up an “alledgedly closed
process’’ to be an instance of ‘‘scapegoating’’ by member states governments. SuccessiveShifting the Balance of Power? 11
doors might have more problems with the opening up of the legislative process (see
Curtin/Meijers 1995).
I argue that in general the operation of a Freedom of Information Right represents a far
more costly form of creating legitimacy. The European Commission, the Council and the
Parliament adopted rules in 1993/94
6 following the Maastricht Crisis. After the right of
access to documents has been laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty, the proposal for a
regulation is currently under consideration
7. The adoption of Freedom of Information
legislation means to give any person the right to inspect any document produced by a
specific institution, subject to certain recognised exemptions, such as the safeguarding of
national security, commercial secrecy, personal privacy etc. This citizen right is thereby
more far-reaching then a limited obligation to publish certain documents on the legislative
process on the Internet. Its consequence is that citizens cannot only better participate, but
also hold the institution accountable for the handling of cases. This is by no means
convenient for officials. Moreover, the right of the individual citizen has to be balanced
against other interests which are often ill-defined in legislative terms, such as personal
privacy and commercial secrecy and worst, the ‘‘public interest’’. While it is beyond doubt
that a well enforced FoI right can create legitimacy (see for the Swedish experience
Freivalds 1996), organisation often perceive its exercise as costly. Moreover, critical
European Councils asked the Commission to make itself more accessible, to reduce the jargon
in its proposals and to enhance access to documentation etc. In fact, the Commission was more
rather than less accessible than national administrations (1994: 346 ff.). See the three
communications adopted CEC, 1992, An open and structured dialogue between the Commission
and special interest groups. Communication from the Commission on 2 December 1992, OJ C
1993, 63 p. 2; CEC, 1992, Increased transparency in the work of the Commission.
Communication from the Commission on 2 December 1992, OJ C 1993, 63 p. 8; CEC, 1993,
Openness in the Community. Communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee on 2 June 1993, COM (93) 258 final, OJ C 1993 166, p. 4
6 Council and Commission adopted in December 1993 by common agreement a Code of Conduct
(OJ 1993 L 340 p. 41) concerning public access to documents which enumerated principles
governing public access to documents in their possession. The Council adopted through ad
Decision (OJ 1993 L 340 p. 43) provisions for the implementation of the principles set out in the
Code of Conduct, followed by the Commission on 8 February 1994 (OJ 1994 L 46 p. 58).
7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public
access to documents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. COM
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observers are likely to take up and discuss first and foremost cases in which access to
information was delayed or refused. Consider for example the European Commission: In
general the exercise of the FoI right seems to work smoothly with information provided in
approximately 90% of the cases. However, critics predominantly focus on a long list of court
and Ombudsman cases and thus instances of information refusals
8.T om a k em a t t e r s
worse, the seekers of information are sometimes supported by the Danish, Dutch or
Swedish governments which make thereby clear that they have a much broader
understanding of freedom of information rights than the European Commission or the
Council.
The Empowering of NGOs
While the exercise of an FoI Right remains difficult for an organisation, ‘‘electronic
consulting’’ is a rapidly expanding practice among international organisations. This can
best be understood by taking the increased importance of NGO’s into account. In the past
year it has become very clear that the Internet empowers the networking and campaigning
of NGOs on a global level (Smythe 1999/Smith 1999). This development seems surprising
given that much of the Internet utopia was initially staged on the local level. Global
networking might be facilitated through a number of factors. Over the past decade the
number of NGOs and their membership have grown hugely
9. Other than on a local or
8 see for instance ECJ, judgement of October 19, 1995, in case T-194/94, John Carvel and the
Guardian v. Council E.C.R. II-2765, Judgement of March 5, 1997 in case T-105/95, WWF UK v.
Commission, Judgement of February 6, 1998 in case T-124/96, Interporc Im- und Export Gmbh
v. Commission E.C.R. II-231, Judgement of March 19, 1998 in case T-83/96 Van der Wal v.
Commission E.C.R. II-545, Judgement of June 17, 1998 in case T-174/95, Svenska
Journalistförbundet (Tidningen Journalisten) v. Council, Judgement of July 19, 1999 in case T-
188/97 Rothmans v. Commission, Judgement of 14 October, 1999 in case T-309/97 The
Bavarian Lager Company v. Commission. A number of other cases is still pending. The
European Commissions seeks in particular to protect documents from disclosure related to
infringement proceedings. This is accepted by the Court of First Instance. However, when the
Commission argued that Comitology committees were entirely distinct from and independent of
the Commission and that minutes of committee sitting were consequently not Commission
documents, the Court of First Instance annulled the Commission decision (see Rothmans v.
Commission). The Ombudsman has actively encouraged a number of EU institutions to adopt
rules on access to documents (see Öberg 1998).
9 The Economist, 11th December 1999Shifting the Balance of Power? 13
national level NGOs often do not directly compete for an audience, membership or money
on a global level. The issues which are on the decision agenda of international
organisations often affect such a broad range of interests that even NGOs from the same
state can mobilise different clienteles against a single proposal. Nowadays new coalitions
can be build online. The Internet is on a global level more ‘‘facilitating’’ than on a local
level. In other words, with the members of an NGO coalition being spread over different
continents, the added value of using an email-list is bigger than with members of one group
being reachable by a local phone call. Technical NGOs now also specialise in providing
highly sophisticated analysis and information
10.
Paradoxically, NGO’s come mainly together to fight against measures promoting
globalization: ‘‘In effect, as capitalism is globalizing so are its opponents. In both instances
the information revolution is playing a key role’’ (Smythe/Smith 1999). An early instance of
a successful Internet-supported NGO protest campaign was the defeat of the OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Trade and Investment (MAI). This agreement was clearly
designed and intended to limit state discretionary authority to discriminate between
domestic and foreign investment in regulation, thereby reflecting ‘‘the growing power of
capital and the resulting limits on state policy discretion’’ (Smythe/Smith 1999). The
negotiations had been formally launched in May 1995, largely as a result of a United
States led and business supported initiative. The OECD initially only invited input from
organizations which had a formal consultative status, ie. from the Business and Industry
Advisory Committee and the Trade and Industry Advisory Committee. When the text of
the draft agreement was leaked in February 1997, it ended up very quickly on the websites
of two public policy advocacy groups in North America. Domestic attention increased
together with the number of state reservations. A number of countries parliamentary
committees, reflecting public pressure, began public hearings. In October 1998 the French
government withdrew its support and in December 1998 negotiations ended. In their
campaign NGOs have been clearly facilitated through the Internet technology.
‘‘Several NGOs commented on how even though the OECD negotiations centered around complex,
technical issues, conducted in secret in an exclusive organization, by being able to instantaneously
access the latest intelligence and analysis of long complicated draft texts, as well as the state of
10 The Economist, 11th December 1999Shifting the Balance of Power? 14
play of the negotiations, they and their supporters were able to challenge their own government
officials and OECD officials.’’ (Smythe/Smith 1999)
‘‘Civil Society Consultation’’
It can now be observed that international organisations increasingly use the Internet for
‘‘electronic consultation’’. Current instances are the reviewing of the OECD guidelines for
multinational enterprises
11 and the drafting process of the World Development Report by
the World Bank
12. As a rule, organisations publish draft documents on the Internet and
invite and publish comments. More sophisticated, the World Bank selected two NGOs (the
Bretton Woods Project and the New Policy Instit u t e )t om o d e r a t eo n - l i n ed i s c u s s i o n so nt h e
draft report to be posted on the Web every week during a period of six weeks. The OECD
has established an online OECD-Forum on the controversial issue of Biotechnology and
Food Safety. After its defeat in Seattle, the WTO now follows this trend. Currently, the
organisation proposes to establish a so-called Community On-line Forum within its
Internet Site
13. Individuals and groups shall be offered the possibility of posting documents
and of hosting forums on topics of their choice related to the work of the WTO.
One question to be asked is how and to which degree electronic consultation will be linked
to procedural and institutional reforms discussed in this paper. Moreover, the impact of
electronic consultation on legislative and decisional output and the establishment of
legitimacy is yet uncertain.
In my view the changed process is likely to impact on the output, though rather indirectly
than directly. Given that no international organisation or network has an interest in
having its proposals demolished ‘‘in public’’, the input of NGO’s will be duly considered at
an early stage, i.e. even before proposals are published. There is clearly a danger that
policy changes fail to be substantial, with ‘‘green speak’’ and ‘‘human rights speak’’ added
11 http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/newtext.htm
12 http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/events/calendar.htm
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/debate.html
13 see for a questionnaire on this topic http://www.wto.org/feedback.htmShifting the Balance of Power? 15
instead to decisions and documents adopted. However, those organisations whose aims are
diametrically opposed to powerful NGOs might end up in a stalemate situation.
T h e r ea l s os e e m st ob el i t t l ed o u b tt h a tt oa c h i eve a certain ‘‘threshold legitimacy’’ of
transnational governance some form of electronic consultation will soon be required. An
interesting question is whether in future the new standard will ‘‘spill over’’ into the arenas
of national and local governance.Shifting the Balance of Power? 16
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